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Abstract 
The main issues of this thesis are about how the presence of tax practitioner affects 
the reporting behavior of taxpayer and the equilibrium enforcement tax audit function 
and how tax practitioner affects tax compliance decision making process. 
Reinganum and Wilde (1991) has a frontier analysis about these issues. The 
participation of tax practitioner in their model is confined. They consider 
practitioner is “pure service provider" rather than a "professional consultant", i.e. 
practitioner cannot affect the amount of reporting income. This thesis makes 
practitioner more involved in the tax-reporting decision process. In the first model, 
tax practitioner wil l give a strategic advice about estimated taxable income and 
taxpayer can choose either to accept or to reject the advice. In the second model, tax 
practitioner acts as an information provider. Analysis of attitude towards tax 
practitioner between 2 types of taxpayer is performed. 
The result in the first model shows that tax practitioner can promote the level o f 
compliance in a higher level of income range. Besides, change of the exogenous 
acceptance rate of advice would reduce the compliance motivation of tax practitioner. 
The second model shows that taxpayer, when reporting tax, may over and 
under-deduct an expense. Different types of taxpayer wi l l have different preference 
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Introduction and literature review 
1. Introduction 
The literature in tax compliance has good development in the recent two decades. 
Tax compliance problem is as old as tax itself. The economic problem of tax 
compliance is about how taxpayers file their tax returns, especially, how they determine 
the amount of taxable income that they should report, i.e. to cheat or not to cheat (Erard 
and Feinstein (1994)). Tax authorities need to determine when to believe taxpayers 
and when to audit them. Furthermore, the role of tax practitioner is also an interesting 
question in tax compliance game. The difference between normal advisor and tax 
advisor is that tax advisor needs to face the pressure from tax authority, on top of its 
clients. Consider a management consulting company, the consultants there needs to 
find the best business solution for their clients. However, the situation of tax 
consultant is different. After giving a tax advice, tax consultants may need to consider 
whether this advice is too aggressive such that affects their relationship with tax 
authority. No taxpayer wi l l approach a tax practitioner having bad relation with tax 
authority. That is, catering for clients' needs is not the sole objective of tax 
practitioner. Tax practitioner also needs to consider the response of tax authority. 
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This thesis aims at establishing new tax compliance models with tax practitioner. 
Reinganum and Wilde (1991) has discussed about the effect of existence of tax 
practitioner. In that paper, tax practitioner performs as a "preparer" instead of an 
"advisor". In this thesis, we wi l l analyze the roles of tax practitioner from different 
perspectives. 
The motivation of writing this thesis comes from some empirical results and some 
former researches. Reinganum and Wilde (1991) suggests that tax authority wi l l 
impose a higher level of audit probability whenever the return is prepared by tax 
preparer. Eraud, and Brain (1993) gives some different empirical results. The audit 
probability towards tax practitioner is not always higher than that towards taxpayer. 
This result inspires the works in Chapter 2 and 3, where the difference of audit 
probability is related to the level of income. In chapter 4, the advisor roles of tax 
practitioner are further strengthened. We can see that tax practitioner performing an 
advisor role and wi l l affect "honest" type taxpayers whether to use tax advisory 
service. 
After outlining the whole picture of the thesis, some details of each chapter are 
presented as follows. 
In chapter 2 and 3, a model based on Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Reinganum and 
Wilde (1991) wil l be presented. In this model, tax practitioner is able to a strategic 
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advice to taxpayer based on his own objective function. This model wi l l continue to 
use the approaches used in the prior literatures, i.e. the audit policy function and the 
implied reporting policy wil l be determined within the system. The focus of this 
model wi l l still be the interaction between tax authority and taxpayer but the existence 
of strategic tax practitioner wil l affect polices in questions. 
The result in chapter 2 and 3 is important in the following senses. Firstly, we find 
that the audit policy towards tax practitioner is not necessarily larger than that towards 
taxpayer. This result means tax practitioner is not necessarily more tax evasive than 
taxpayer. Furthermore, we show the tax compliance behaviors and audit policies by 
assigning a cost function of audit for tax authority. The main contribution of this 
chapter is using the Reinganum and Wilde (1986, 1991) approach to match other 
theoretical result in tax compliance game such as that in Klepper, Mazur and Nagin 
(1991), which suggests tax practitioner can improves tax compliance rate, and other 
empirical result such as that in Eraud (1993). 
In chapter 4, a new setting model wi l l be introduced. We wil l focus on a particular 
expense to see whether this expense is tax deductible. Similar to that in Erard and 
Feinstein (1994), taxpayers are divided into two types, i.e. honest and non-honest, with 
different objective functions. Moreover, taxpayers are not well informed in this 
model but tax practitioner, similar to the "good" advisor in Morris (2001), is able to 
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give a partially informed advice to taxpayer. This feature captures the advisor role of 
tax practitioner. Tax practitioner is now an information provider instead of a tax 
return preparer. This model is focused on the relationship and interaction between 
taxpayer and tax practitioner. 
As a new attempt in chapter 4, we find some new results regarding tax compliance. 
Firstly, this model, by implementing a simple setting, explains why some taxpayers 
under deduct tax expense (equivalently, they are over reporting their total taxable 
income). Secondly, we introduce a tax practitioner into the model to serve as an 
information provider. Some prior literatures such as Beck, Davis and Jung (1989) and 
Klepper, Mazur and Nagin (1991) have discussed similar role of tax practitioners in 
different perspective. This model considers tax practitioner is not perfectly informed 
but still beneficiary to honest taxpayer. The result is similar to that of Klepper, Mazur 
and Nagin (1991), which investigates tax practitioner's ability to exploit the ambiguous 
features of tax laws to reduce taxpayers' penalties in event that non-compliance is 
detected. 
The whole thesis is focused on how tax practitioner affects the tax compliance 
process in different perspective. In the first model in chapter 2 and 3, we are more 
focused on how existence of tax practitioner the tax authority's decision. In the 
second model, we are more emphasized on how advisory position of tax practitioner 
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affects the decision of whether taxpayer wil l seek tax advisory services. 
2. Literature review 
Before proceeding, it is better to understand what other scholars have explored. 
This section presents a paper survey result and reviews the literatures of tax compliance 
models. 
A frontier and the best-known model of tax compliance is that of Allingham and 
Agnar Sandmo (1972). The model concerns whether a higher tax rate result in more 
or less compliance、This model regards the audit policy as a constant. Consider a 
taxpayer with exogenous income I and tax rate t. Taxpayer may treat and report a 
lower income x. The tax authority does not know the true income I and must enforce 
compliance by auditing taxpayers' account. Penalty is imposed on non-compliance 
activities. Assume the audit policy p, which is a probability of carrying out audit 
0<p<l, is an exogenous variable and independent of reported income x. It is also 
assumed that i f the tax authority carries out tax audit, it can always learn the true 
income I of taxpayer. Taxpayer wil l be penalized 9 (I-x) i f he is caught cheating, 
where 0 is the penalty rate. 
Later, economists try to introduce model with game theory foundation to consider 
the effect of varying audit policy. One of the earliest literatures of tax compliance 
game is Reinganum and Wilde (1986). It builds a model with game-theoretical 
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foundation. The paper assumes that all taxpayers are rational and maximize their 
expected payoffs, which are balanced between the higher tax payment i f they file "true" 
income and the potential plenty payment i f they report "less" income. On the other 
hand, the tax authorities wil l decide their audit policy based on the income reported by 
taxpayers. Reinganum and Wilde (1986) predicts certain level of non-compliance rate, 
which is, however, higher than that of other empirical researches. 
By introducing some social factors, many researchers try to improve the above 
-mentioned theories. Erard and Feinstein (1994) assumes that there is certain 
proportion of taxpayers, who are honest by virtue, and identifies the importance of the 
existence of honest taxpayers. Erard and Feinstein (1994) suggest that it is possible to 
make honesty of taxpayer endogenous by consider other psychological and social 
factors such as the perception of fairness of tax system and reaction to the government 
activities of taxpayers. 
Another interesting extension of the standard model is the introduction of 
influence of tax practitioners. In the model of Reinganum and Wilde (1991), tax 
practitioners, mainly act as the tax representative of taxpayer, can prepare the tax return 
for the taxpayers. In this dynamic model, it is assumed that practitioners set a fee first. 
Next, taxpayers decide whether to use a practitioner (and which one to use). Then, 
tax returns are filed, either by taxpayer himself or by the practitioner on the behalf o f 
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the taxpayer. The subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is acquired by using 
backward induction. 
Greenberg (1984) uses a different approach to tackle the tax compliance problem. 
The new approach tries to find a mechanism to limit the non-compliance rate to a 
exogenous given number a . This paper successfully describes a mechanism in an 
infinitive horizon tax compliance game model and set out the policies condition for 
anti-avoidance purpose. The mechanism divides taxpayers into three groups. The 
tax authority wil l assign a specific audit probability in each group. The first group is 
the less likely to be audited and third group wil l be audited in a period with probability 
1. Each taxpayer is possible to shift from one group to another, in the first two groups, 
based on whether they cheated the tax authority. Also, taxpayer is possible to 
delegate from the second to the third group i f he cheated. However, it is not possible 
to be promoted from third group to the second or first group once the tax. The paper 
then proved, in equilibrium, that the proportion of taxpayers wi l l cheat is limited to 
exactly a number a , where a is the proportion of taxpayer belongs to first group at 
the beginning of the game. 
There are plenty of literatures related to tax compliance. However, we only list 
those more related to this thesis in the above section. 
-End of Chapter 1-
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Chapter 2 
Model of tax compliance, with strategic 
involvement of tax practitioner 
1. Introduction 
l . l Background 
In this chapter, we wil l demonstrate how the presence and action of taxpayer 
affect the reporting behavior and tax audit policy. As mentioned in Reinganum and 
Wilde (1991), tax practitioners, mainly act as the tax representatives of taxpayers, can 
either provide tax law information or prepare the tax return for the taxpayers. In this 
model, tax practitioner wil l make a strategic advice to taxpayers. The story flow is 
set out as follows. It is assumed that practitioners set a fee first. Next, taxpayers 
decide whether to use a practitioner. Then, tax returns are filed, either by taxpayer 
himself or by the practitioner on the behalf of the taxpayer. The dynamic 
equilibrium of this model is acquired by using backward induction. In the model 
under this section, tax practitioner is involved in the tax reporting decision process. 
Tax practitioner acts as a tax consultant and taxpayer can either accept or reject the 
advice. I f the taxpayer rejects the advice, the tax practitioner wi l l act as tax returns 
preparer only. I f the taxpayer accepts the advice, the tax practitioner wil l serve both 
his advisory and preparation role. The analysis wil l be based on the method set out 
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in Reinganum and Wilde (1986). 
The reasons of having the extensions in this chapter are motivated by: 
1. Some the empirical findings, e.g. in Eraud (1993), shows that the 
compliance rate and audit rate do depends on the existence of tax 
practitioner; and 
2. The role of tax practitioner in the practice not only provides tax returns 
preparation, but also give opinion about the tax position of client, i.e. the 
taxpayers. 
We wi l l introduce this model in this chapter and further analyze with specific form 
penalty function in the next chapter. Before proceeding, we would briefly introduce 
the model of Reinganum and Wilde (1986) as a starting point. 
1.2 A brief review of a game theoretical tax compliance model 
The presentation and content of the following part is based on the work of 
Reinganum and Wilde (1986). Most of the wordings and symbols are presented in 
accordance with those presented in Reinganum and Wilde (1986). 
The flow of game is presented as follows: There are two players in the game, 
i.e. taxpayer and tax authority. The taxpayer observes his true income; we wi l l often 
refer to the taxpayer's true income as the taxpayer's "type". Based on this true 
income, the taxpayer wi l l convey a reported income to the tax authority. The tax 
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authority wil l make some conjectures and have some beliefs on the true income of the 
taxpayer based on the reporting income made by the taxpayer. With the reporting 
income made by the taxpayer and the conjectures above mentioned. The tax 
authority chooses a level of effort to be devoted for auditing the taxpayer. This kind 
of effort is assumed to generate a probability that the taxpayer's true income can be 
verified. 
Define the true income of the taxpayer is a random variable / g [ / ,7], where 
/ < 7 < 00, with distribution F(.). Let x be the reported income for a taxpayer. A 
strategy for the taxpayer is the reporting strategy x = r { I ) , where r : [ / , / ] - > ( - 0 0 , 0 0 )； 
that is, the taxpayer may report any level of income, not just those which might 
possibly occur. I f the taxpayer is not investigated, then he is asked to pay a tax of tx 
dollars; that is, proportional taxation system is imposed. 
I f the taxpayer is audited and his true income is ascertained, then a tax plus a 
penalty proportional to the evaded tax is assessed. I f J is the true in come of taxpayer, 
the taxpayer needs to pay tl + tnij - x) to settle. 
The tax authority wi l l choose a level of effort to devote to tax audit and 
compliance enforcement. This effort is costly. The investigation procedure yields a 
audit probability, which is monotonically increasing in effort, so that we can treat the 
tax authority as choosing a probability of verification, with an associated effort cost. 
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Let p be the probability of undertaking tax audit. 
A strategy for the tax authority is a tax audit policy p=p(x), where 
p ： (一00，00) -> [0,1]. Since any report x is possible, the audit policy is defined for all 
X in the real line. This formulation assumes that the probability of the audit function 
is independent of the extent of under-reporting, and that investigation results either in 
accurate income audit, or no new information (that is , whenever tax audit is carried 
out, the true taxable income could be identified). 
Denote that c{p) be the cost to the tax authority of sustaining probability p of 
undertaking tax audit. Assuming that c(0)=0 and that c(.) is twice continuously 
differentiable for p g [0,1) and satisfies the following restrictions: for p g [0,1), 
( A 1 ) 0 < c,(/?)<oo,0< c"(/0<oo 
( A 2 ) l i m =①，and 
p>1 
(A3) c ⑷ + p> ~~！—, where FI is the penalty rate to the penalty concerned. 
c ' \ p ) i + n 
Restriction A3 is a curvature condition which ensures that the marginal cost of tax audit 
does not rise too fast. 
Since the tax authority does not observe I directly, it must form beliefs or 
conjectures which relate reporting income x to I. Let /.i{s | x) denote the tax 
authority's prior probability assessment that the true income / of a taxpayer who reports 
X belongs to the set s c [ / ,7] . Further, it is required that / / ( [ / ,7 ] | x) = 1; that is, the 
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tax authority's belief cannot assign to any report / which is known to be not existed. 
It is assumed that the tax authority and taxpayer are risk natural and maximize the 
expected net revenue and expected income respectively. 
Expected net revenue to the tax authority when it observes a report of x and 
chooses a probability p o f verification, conditional upon its beliefs | x ) , is 0 
R , (X，p- jii) = p{tE^ ( / I X ) + ( / I jc) - X)] + (1 - p)tx - c(p) 
where | jc) represents the expected value of the taxpayer's income, given that he 
reported income x, based on the tax authority's prior probability assessment JLI ； that 
is J / 6 / " ( / | x ) . 
uj] 
Expected net income to a taxpayer who has true income I and reports income x, 
conditional on the audit policy p(.), is 
AV，X，p) 二 p [ I - / / - t7r{I — X)] + {x))(I - tx) (*) 
Note that the taxpayer bears no costs when being investigate, suffering a penalty 
only i f noncompliance is ascertained. The function R(x, p\ / / ) and x\ p) 
represent the payoffs to the tax authority and taxpayer, respectively. 
To capture the equilibrium condition we have define: 
Definition a: A vector { j j { s | •), ) is an dynamic equilibrium if; 
(1) p(x) maximizes Rp (x, p ; / / ) , given the beliefs /J{S | •)； 
(2) r ( / ) maximizes N{I,x; p), given the audit policy p(.) ； and 
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(3) jLi{s I x) is the conditional probability (under the prior distribution F(- ) ) that 
--1 --1 -—1 
I Gsr^r (X) given that I(x),whenever r (x) is not an empty set. 
The above definition admits the possibility o f pooling equilibriums, in which 
—-1 . 
r (X) is set-valued. However, Reinganum and Wilde (1986) were specifically 
interested in a separating equilibrium in which r ( / ) is monotonically increasing; in 
—-1 
this case, r (x) is single-valued. Consequently, we define point beliefs, which 
assign a unique real income of taxpayer to each point x. Let r : (-oo, oo) — [ / , 7] 
denote these beliefs. Given the beliefs r(-), we can rewrite the expected revenue to 
the tax authority as follows. 
p- ju) = p[tT(x) + t7T{T{x) - x)] + ( 1 - p ) t x - c{p) (**) 
After introduce the beliefs r(-)，we have: 
Definit ion b: A vector (r(-), pi：),广(.))is a separating equilibrium if; 
(1) p、x) maximizes R^ (x, p\ r ) , given the beliefs r(x)； 
(2) r(I) maximizes N(J, x; p)，given the audit policy p(x), and 
(3) r ( r ( / ) ) = / for all / g [ / , / ] . 
Alternatively, a consistency condition equivalent to (3) is 
r ( x ) = r ' ( j c ) for all 
Necessary conditions for a separating equilibrium: The tax authority 
maximizes R{X, p\ JLI) by a choice of p = p{x). Point-wise optimization requires 
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that (given p{x) is interior): 
Rp (X’ p； / / ) = t{\ + ； r ) ( r ( x ) { p { x ) ) = 0 (a) 
Since c ' (p ) > 0 for all p , equation ( I ) is necessary and sufficient to determine the 
optimal verification policy p(x ) ( given r (x ) )• 
The taxpayer maximizes N { l j { l ) \ p) by a choice o f x = r(J). I f p{-) is 
differentiable, then the optimal report (given r( jc)) solves 
=厂,(K/))H(1 + r ( / ) ) ] + p{r{l))t7r - / ( I 一 p{r{I)) : 0 (b) 
I f /?(•) is twice differentiable, then a second-order necessary condition is 
N“I,m,P、= P、' ( K / ) ) H O + r(m + 2p, ( r ( / ) ) / ( l + ; r ) < 0 (c) 
Equations (1), (2) and (3) hold simultaneously at equilibrium. Incorporating the 
consistency condition that I = r(X) 二 /厂‘(A:) , we can rewrite equations (a), (b) and (c) 
as follows: 
/ ( I + 7r)(r-' (x)-x)-c' (p(x)) = 0 (a,) 
P'ix)[-ti\ + 71)-(r-i(X) - X)] + p{x)t7r —1{\ -p{x)) = 0 (b') 
P' ’ (x)[-t{\ + 7r)-{r' (x) - X)] + 2/y (x) / ( l + 7r)<0 (c') 
Solving (a，）and (b') can be combined to give equation (d) below, 
一 p、{xy {p{x)) + t7q?(x) - / ( I - p(x)) 二 0 (d) 
Equation (d) captures the equilibrium behavior o f tax authority. After we solve 
equation (d) and obtained optimum p(x), we can substitute p(x) back to equation (a，) 
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and obtain the inverse reporting policy and then the reporting policy wi l l be found. 
Reinganum and Wilde (1986) deduced the following Lemma by differentiating 
equation (a，）and (b') and setting p and r at optimal. 
Lemma A: 
— --1 d — 
If {p{x\r ( x ) ) satisfies (c、) with a strict inequality, then ——p{x) < 0 and 
' dx 
For the proof of the above Lemma, interested reader may refer to Reningum and 
Wilde(1986), Lemma 1. 
However, the cost function c(p) is not specified. To solve the system of 
differential equations, we need to specify the form of the cost function c(p). 
I f we set c(p) - - c l n ( l - p) ’ where c is a constant, according to Definit ion b, 
we get the following equilibrium conditions: 
(i) The audit policy is given by 
p{x) = \ - 7 r l [ \ + 7r-Qx\i{-{t7rlc){x-x)}] for x e [x ,x] 
(ii) The reporting policy r(I) is the unique value of x g [x, X] such that 
, 一 " 、 1 + ;r - exp { - ( / ; r / c)(x - r ( / ) ) } _ , „ 7, / = , ( / ) + ； \ \ 八 for /£[乙/]， 
(i i i) The beliefs which assign a taxpayer type I to each observed report x are given by 
- —1 -
T(X) = r (x) for x e [x, x] 
In summary, the above 3 conditions describe the optimal behaviors of the tax 
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authority and taxpayer. According to Lemma A and the above result, we p{x) is 
downward sloping. That means the higher the reporting income, the lower the audit 
chance, given the taxable income I. Furthermore, the reporting policy of r{I) is 
strictly smaller than I for I g [/ , 7] and /*(/) < x. That means taxpayer wil l always 
non-comply. 
2. The Model 
.良 
Use practitioner practitioner to subgame 2 
choose a X by Z 
taxpayer，to ^ ^ 
subgame 1 V L < / \ 
, \ J Take the 
1-a 广 a 




The procedures of the model to be presented are showed in the above figure and are 
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presented as follows. The above figure is not presenting a standard game tree because 
some of variables in the branches presented are not strategic variables. 
The flow of this model is similar to that of Reningum and Wilde (1986). The only 
difference is the presence of tax practitioner who wil l give a strategic advice. Firstly, 
we have the actual income of taxpayer, an exogenous variable, I. The taxable income 
is the actual income less deductible expense. Define is a random variable 
represents the taxable income such that 八 e [ / ” / , ] . In figure 1, we can see that 
practitioner wil l set the fee first and then taxpayer wil l choose a reporting income x, 
where x is a random variable such that x g [X, x] . Then, the game is split into 2 sub 
-models. At this time, the taxpayer wil l determine its reporting income x based on his 
true taxable income. The sub-model in the right hand side (called "sub-model 2") 
describes a simple tax compliance game without participation of tax practitioner. 
Taxpayer prepares tax return by itself. The sub-model in left hand side (called 
sub-model 1) describes a tax compliance game with participation of tax practitioner. 
We wi l l focus on the sub-model 1 our model. For subgame 2, the interested reader 
can refer to Reningnum and Wilde (1986). We wil l also show that the result o f 
subgame 2 is included in subgame 1. 
After confirming the taxpayer wi l l use its service, tax practitioner wil l determine 
the strategic advisory reporting taxable income, given the true taxable income of the 
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taxpayer. This advisory reporting income y has the similar nature of the reporting 
income of reporting income of taxpayer x. We define random variable y&[y,y] be 
the advisory reporting income made by tax practitioner. 
The players are assumed to be able to observe the portion of taxpayer who w i l l 
accept the service provided by the tax practitioners. Thus, we have exogenous a. 
With exogenous and non-strategic variable a, which represents the proportion of 
taxpayer who wil l take the advice of tax practitioner, tax practitioners are ordered to 
prepare the tax return based on the decision of taxpayer or on the advice made by them. 
Tax practitioners wi l l then declare their preparer role to the tax authority whenever 
their advice is not accepted. Thus, tax authority wi l l know whether taxpayer or tax 
practitioner decide the reporting income. The tax authority wi l l determine the tax 
audit policy strategy based on the above information. Define p the probability o f 
verification, i.e. the tax audit policy. It is noted that the audit policy function towards 
those returns "advised" by tax practitioner and "prepared" by advisor is different. We 
denote /?,(•) be the audit policy function for taxpayer's self-filed returns, p^^(-) be 
the audit policy towards those "prepared" by tax practitioner (i.e. the reporting income 
is decided by taxpayer) and be the audit policy towards those "advised" by tax 
practitioner. 
It is assumed that the parties in the model are risk natural and the only objective is 
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maximizing their expected payoffs. Therefore, the objective functions of the players 
in this model would be the net payoffs of each player. The method of setting up the 
following payoffs is simple ~ total (expected) benefit less total (expected) cost. The 
payoffs of taxpayer are set according to the income level (exogenously given), the 
expected tax payment and penalty and the professional fee, i f any. The payoffs of tax 
practitioner are set by the fee income less the (expected) cost associated to the tax 
preparation and tax audit. Finally, the payoffs of tax authority are set according the 
expected tax revenue Jess the audit cost. 
According to the steps of the model, the criteria of determining payoffs 
mention-above and the notation in Reinganum and Wilde (1986 and 1991), we set the 
payoffs as follows: 
Payoff 1 is that taxpayer chooses to use practitioner but do not accept the advice 
of practitioner (Payoff 1，2, 3: (Taxpayer, Tax practitioner, Authority)) 
Payoff {x)[I - tIt - tn(Jt - x)] + (1 - Pp’丈(x))(I-tx)-F, 
Pp丈{x)[tT^ (x) + t7i{T,⑴—X)] + (1 - pp”x {x))tx - c、p p K (X)) } 
Payoff 2 is that taxpayer chooses to use practitioner and accepts the advice o f 
practitioner: 
Payoff 2: { Pp、y(y)[I — // , - t7r{I, — y)] + (1 — 少 ( y ) ) { I - t y ) - F , 
F P p y {y)7tpt{Ty (/)—少 + V夕）’ 
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tT{y)八冗 + np iy)-少)]+ (1 —尸,,’少{y))ty^ — c、p 丨,乂 (力）} 
Payoff 3 is that taxpayer file tax return by itself. 
Payoff 3 : { p, (x ) [ / — — t7i{I,-x)-vj + ( l - p , (x))(/ - tx) — u,, ’ 0 ’ 
Pt[tA^) + 议 [ r , ( 。 - x ] ] + ( l - /7^ ) tx — c、pt)} 
Where 
I is the actual income of taxpayer; 
I t is the taxable income (after allowable deductions), 
t is the effective tax ..rate; 
X e [x, x] is the reporting taxable income set by taxpayer; 
y e [ y , y ] , is the reporting taxable income advised by tax practitioner; 
is the audit policy function; [x,x] >[0,1] for taxpayer self-prepare tax return; 
pp’入x) is the audit policy function: [x, x] >[0,1] , for taxpayer with a tax 
practitioner but without accepting the advice made by the practitioner; 
Pp,y{y) is the audit policy function:[之，少] ) {0, l ] , for taxpayer with a tax 
practitioner but without accepting the advice made by the practitioner; 
F is the competitive professional fee set by tax practitioner; 
c{p) is the cost to the tax authority o f sustaining non-negative probability p< 1 o f 
verification, this ftinction is assumed to be twice differentiable. Following the setting 
in Reinganum and Wilde (1986), we have 3 restrictions to this cost function; 
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( A 1 ) 0 < c'(p)<cx),0< c"(p)<oc 
(A2) l im c' (p) = 00，and 
p >I 
c，(p) 1 
(A3) ^ ^ + /? > , where 11 is the penalty rate to the penalty concerned. 
c'\p) 1 + n 
2 ( - ) , a mapping (—00’00) , denotes the expected value of taxable 
income from the tax authority, given the reporting income x or y; 
Up is the unit cost (benefit) for practitioner for every dollar of taxable income advised 
by practitioner over the taxable income decided by tax payer, 
iipp is the fixed preparation cost, per return, of tax practitioner; 
IIP^ is the fixed preparation cost, per self-filed return, of taxpayer; 
Vp is the additional cost for dealing with tax audit for tax practitioner; 
V, is the additional cost for dealing with tax audit for taxpayer; 
Ttp is the penalty rate charged the tax practitioner for the amount of underreported tax 
after tax audit enforcement. Noted that tax authority wi l l penalize the tax practitioner 
only i f taxpayer uses the service and accept the advice of tax practitioner; 
TT is the penalty rate charged to the taxpayer; 
a e (0,1) is an exogenous variable representing the proportion/probability o f 
taxpayer who wi l l accept tax practitioner's advice. 
Because practitioner wi l l incur information cost, preparation and time cost to convince 
taxpayer to accept its "unfavorable" advice, it is necessary to introduce an additional 
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cost of every dollar that the practitioner over report taxpayer to capture this fact. 
On the other hand, i f the advised reporting income is lower than the reporting income 
set by taxpayer, (x>y), the -z〜(y-x) is a positive number. The economics reason is 
that the practitioner may require less cost (every lower than z^^^) i f they can "cater" for 
it client by giving a more favorable advice. 
3. Equi l ibr ium conditions 
In order to establish the dynamic equilibrium conditions, following the literature of 
Reningum and Wilde (1986 and 1991), we define the expected payoff the three parties 
as follows: 
Tax authority: 
- a - 句 ⑷ ( x ) + tK{T^ (X) — X)] + (1 - Pp x {x))tx - ^ (x))} + (1) 
a{Pp’y OO [〜(y) + K 冗 + 兀 p OO - y)] + (1-Pp’y {y))ty 一 ⑴ ) } 
Rt ( I ’ Pt W； = Pt + ( x ) - x ] } + {\-p^ {x))tx - c、Pt) (2) 
Rp is the expected payoff of tax authority in sub-model 1 
R^  is the expected payoff of tax authority in sub-model 2 
Taxpayer: 
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= ( 1 - - t7r{I, - X)] + (1 - p^^^ (x))(/ -tx)-F}+ (3) 
(APp’y 00[/ - tIt — tn{l,-力]+ (卜 Pp’y {y))(I - ty) - F} 
N, Ut, X； Pt {X)) - pt (x ) [ / — tit — - x ) - v j + ( l - p t ( x ) ) ( / - t x ) - u 約 (4) 
Np is the expected payoff of taxpayer in sub-model 1 
Nt is the expected payoff、of taxpayer in sub-model 2 
Practitioner: 
n p (x, y, F, p^^ (y)) : F - ii^ (y-x)-ap^^ 00;zV(r，00 —少 + v 》 （5) 
n办，兄70 = 0 
n ^ is the expected payoff of tax practitioner in sub-model 1 
n , is the expected payoff of tax practitioner in sub-model 2 
The setting of taxpayer's equations is based on the model of Reningum and Wilde 
(1986), except a constant cost w灼 is added in equation (4). In other words, 
equations (2) and (4) are corresponding to equation (* ) and (**) . 
Now, define the strategies o f different players in the model. The strategy o f 
taxpayer is the intended level of reporting taxable income x= 1\(1(), where 厂叉 is a 
mapping; [/( > ( - O O , G O ) . The strategy of tax authority is the audit policy. In 
sub-model 2, we denote the audit policy pp~= pp,z ( '), where pp： ( - 0 0 , 0 0 ) >[0,1], 
where z is equal to x or y. Any audit policy is a function of reporting income, either 
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decided by taxpayer or tax practitioner. Since any reporting income level is possible, • 
the audit policy function must defined on the domain from negative infinity to positive 
infinity. Moreover, as we assumed that tax authority could detect any disparity of 
reporting income i f tax audit actually take place. Thus, the expected taxable income 
r(x) should be equal to the corresponding actual taxable It in equilibrium. The 
strategy of taxpayer is the intended level of reporting taxable income 少二 r//々，where r), 
is a mapping: [/,，/,] > ( - Q O , O O ) . Similarly, tax authority should be able to 
estimate the actual taxable income given the reporting income from tax practitioner at 
equilibrium. 
Noted that when a converges to 0, i.e. taxpayer is not going to accept the advice 
made by tax practitioner, equation (1) and (3) wi l l be very similar to equation ((2) and 
(4), except for the constant terms in equation (3). Also, after taking first derivative, 
the system of first order condition of (1) and (3) wil l be reduced to that of (2) and (4)， 
i.e. the system of not seeking advice. 
Following the definition of equilibrium of Reinganum and Wilde (1986), we 
have the following definition for sub-model 1: 
DEFINITION 1: A vector ( i j ) , ^ ) , J J x ) ’ J ^ i y ) ， ( . ) , ^ (.) )is a dynamic 
equilibrium i f F (•) and r^ (•) is monotone increasing, where and ry(I^ =y, and 
(a)尸尸 “ X ) and 少 O ) maximizes given the beliefs r^(-) and r乂）’’ 
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(b) r j - ) maximizes JV^, given audit policy p p a n d Pp ,,{y) ； and 
(c)尸少(•) maximizes FI^, given audit policy p卩入 x ) and Pp^yiy). 
Furthermore, we need to impose consistency conditions such that the expectation 
of tax authority is consistence with the reporting income of taxpayer and tax 
practitioner. The 2 conditions are: 
(d) r ; \ x ) for all x E and 
(e) ？7 7 ) = for all y .)] 
First order condition for the equilibrium of sub-model 1: 
The tax authority maximizes R^^ (x, y, p^ ^ (x), ^ (y)- r^, r^ ) by choosing 
Ppx(x) and pp Local optimization requires i f the solution of audit policy is 
interior: 
dR^ —— —— 
^ T - T T = + 树 ( X ) - x ) ] - t x - c ’ ( p p ^  (x))} = 0 (6) 
oPpA^) 
dR^ —— —— 
- " " " ^ = oc{[tT{y) + 7 t t ( T { y ) - y ) ] - t y - ( y ) ) } = 0 (7) 
^PpAy) 
The taxpayer maximizes by choosing x . I f p^(x) 
is differentiable the local interior optimal conditions is 
(8) 
= 0 - oc){p^J{x)\I - U 丨-tjr{l, — x)] + PpJx)U - p"(xKI-tx)-i\-p^Jx))t} = 0 
The tax practitioner maximizes by choosing 少 . I f p ” ( y 、 i s 
differentiable the local interior optimal conditions is 
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an „ 
二”厂 app，v (y) ->，+、〜）-app，y V '(>') - 1 ) = 0 (9) 
After solving equations (6)，(7)，(8) and (9) and considering the consistency 
conditions, i.e. r j \ x ) = I ^ and Ty{y)= = at optimal, we have a 
simplified system of equations: 
(T,(X)-X)= J ( 1 0 ) 
/(I + 71) 
j—r\ 、 ^ ' ( P p A y ) ) … 、 
i T y i y ) - y ) = . (11) 《1 + TT) 
〜 ‘ ⑷ [ 汉 - i ^ ) 二 / 对 ^ - X)] + + / ] _ / = 0 (12) 
“p - - y + y p ) - - 0 = 0 (13) 
From (6，）and (8’)’ 
( 1 4 ) 
Let a = l/aTTpt, we can express (13) as: 
/ V / C y ) ( 。 0 0 —少+ v」+尸凡/少)(r/0；) —l) + «w，= 0 (15) 
The second order conditions for sub-model 2 are set-our as (16) to (19): 
/ 〉 、 2 二 ( r > ) - i ) - c ” a v w ) } < 0 (16) 
op pA” . 
J = (Ty ( y ) - 1 ) — c”（p ” ⑴ ) } < 0 (17) 
26 
^ ^ = (1 - a ) / i x ) [ t x - t I t -tTTiJt — X)] + p凡, \x ) [ t + tTT)] + Pp.太• {X)[t7r + / ] | < 0 
dx ‘ 
or 
/ V ” ⑴ + 兀Wt -；州 + 2 / V . '⑶ / [ I + ; r)]<0 (18) 
= -ccpp , 0 0 — + V 》—2 a p p ’ y \y)7r^tiT^. \ y ) - \ ) - ( x p ^ ⑴ 冗 / ( r / , (>')) < 0 
办 ’ ‘ 
or 
P P ’ Y ’ ‘ � � + + 广 / ⑴ V � - 1 ) + / V � V ( r / C v ) ) (19) 
The equations (14) and (15) characterize the audit policy o f tax authority given 
equilibrium conditions are met. The feasible solutions of (10) and (11) also implies 
an inverse reporting policy r “ x ) = (x) and r “ ) ' ) =尸广(少）b y substituting 
the solutions of (14) and (15) into (10) and (11). When compare equation (14) with 
the equation (7) of Reinganum and Wilde (1986). We know that these two equations 
are the same. Thus, we have proposition 1 as follow. 
Proposition 1: 
When a taxpayer uses a practitioner but does not take the advice of the practitioner, 
the audit policy of tax authority will be determined in the same manner as if taxpayer 
files its own return, i.e. Pp^ix) = p人x). ’ given the boundary condition(s) of the 
corresponding differential equation in both cases is (are) the same. 
Proof: 
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The first order condition for audit policy of Reinganum and Wilde (1986) are: 
c\pV)) 
As we assume sub-model one follows the model setting of Reinganum and Wilde 
(1986), thus the audit policy optimal condition should he the same as the above 
differential equation, after adopting the notation set out in this chapter, i.e. 
c'{p;{x)) 
The audit policy of I'use“practitioner but not "use “ its advice is the equation (14): 
t7rp„Ax)-i{\- p„Ax)) 
乂 ⑴ = " “ 、 , ， 、 r 
If the boundary condition of pi and p2 are the same, after solving the differential 
equations we should have p^ ^ (x) = p^ (x). 
Note: we claim that the setting of sub-model 2 is the same as Reinganum and Wilde 
(1986). However, equation (2) and (4) are the same as the expected payoffs equations 
in Reinganum and Wilde (1986) except that equation (4) has an additional item z./^,^, 
which is a constant. As w只 is constant and thus will not affect the first order 
condition and thus does not affect the argument made above. Q .E.D 
Proposition 1 is important in the model formation because we can now simplify the 
model without losing generality. The rationale of focusing on sub-model 1 is now 
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justified because, in optimal, the audit policy, and thus the reporting policy, of 
sub-model 1 can be characterized by that of sub-model 2. 
4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we consider a single period, with multiple steps, tax compliance 
model and obtained the results for the comparison between taxpayer and tax 
practitioner. We have the following two key points to note. 
The key idea of this chapter is the implementation of the "advice", y, made by 
tax practitioner, although this advice does not give additional information to taxpayer 
in the setting. Without this variable y, we simply cannot compare the audit policies 
towards tax practitioner and taxpayer and reporting policies made by them. Another 
key assumption of this model is that tax practitioners wil l incur a cost when they make 
additional deductions, y- x, and, on the other hand, they wi l l have a cost reduction 
benefit when they make a less deductions, x-y. This setting captures the subtle 
relationship between taxpayer and tax practitioner. The relationship between 
taxpayers and tax practitioner are linked by this part in the equation. 
-End of Chapter 2-
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Chapter 3 
A further analysis of the model of tax 
compliance, with strategic involvement of tax 
practitioner 
1. Further analysis wi th a defined form cost function 
In this chapter, a detailed analysis with a specific form cost function wi l l be 
presented to characterize the equilibrium behavior. 
• 
Let the audit policy function be c{p) = -c\n{\- p). This function has some 
desirable properties. First, the first derivative of c(p) is positive and ( A l ) is 
satisfied. Secondly, the cost wi l l tend to infinitive i f p tends to unity; i.e. (A2) is also 
satisfied. Finally, this function also satisfied (A3) because 
c (P、+ p = \> for all positive penalty rates n. 
c"(/?) 1 + n 
We impose the initial conditions广“：0 =〇 for equation 14 and /?厂少0 0 = 0 for 
equation (15). After solving (14) and (15), we have 
⑶ = 1 - ( 2 Q ) 
After solving (15), we have: 
— ： ) + (y)) = -y + y (21 -0) 
i ‘ P 《 1 - + 冗 ） 
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After solving (21-0) and confining the value of Pp{y) within 0 and 1, we have: 
^ = ( h i ^ - 歹 + 二 - 歹 + 衝 — ， 1 (21), where 
a 兀 , 
0C\' 
We can see that (20) and (21) are continuous over the domain. 
By substituting p^{x) and Pp{y) into (10) and (11), we get the inverse of 
reporting policy ,,丨(少）and ,广 ( x ) : 
尸 广 ⑴ = ？ ⑴ ” + - J (22) 
广 , ⑷ 二 r ⑴ … ~ ~ , , ,, ： (23) 
Corollary 1: If c(/7) = - c l n ( l - / ? ) , then equations (20), (21),(22) and (23) could 
characterize the dynamic equilibrium behaviors, according to definition 1. 
Furthermore, we require the following conditions such that 0 < Pp{y) < 1: 
( B l ) ( - ^ - v ^ ) > 0 ; a n d 
(1 +幻 
(B2) A ^ B and B>0 
We need to compare the two audit policies in (20) and (21) to see whether one of 
1 In order to confine the probability in the domain between 0 and 1，we choose this path as the audit 
policy of y. 
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them has higher value than another and the conditions and ranges such that 
X > (，<, 广 二 ) y (少)• Here we need to find the expression of intersecting 
point of pp入x) and Ppy{y) and the parametric conditions of existence of such 
intersection. 
After solving (20) and (21) and assuming that x=}', we have the intersecting 
point of reporting income x* = y* at Pp^ i^ ) = Pp,v(y) ^ 0 as a solution of the 
following equation: 
A 7 " 、 、 广 7 、 ( - \ ,L -t7r(x-x). J TT \x-xjTT = -A \ + 7r-exp( )-7r -B n =—— 
、 ， I � M 1 +冗 - e x p(宇) j 
After simplification， 
/ —— \ 
A 1 —expfZ 冗 ( 2 4 ) 
V ^ J 
We can express the unique real solution, x", of (24) as: 
. - \ A ^ c , 「 j/ ( + 
X = x-< — + BTT h product log exp ——^ L 卜 (25) 
n tn [ c c J 
The value of x* is a function of the parameters x,A= ，B - - c 
+ lip , 
TT and t . As x* g [0, x), i f intersection uniquely exists, we have the following 
condition for the existence of an intersection of p ” ( X ) and Ppy {y ) : 
32 
A c , , 「 力 广 + n] — 八 
0<{ — + B7r + ——product log exp ^ ^ < x (26) 
n tK L 、 c yU 
Furthermore, the existence of such intersecting point means that, in some range, 
/ ^ ⑴ 本 < ) / V v ⑴ . 
Proposition 2: 
The audit policy enforcement towards lax practitioner can be higher, lower or equal, 
in some ranges of x and y, than that towards taxpayer even if the practitioner 
penalties are strictly, positive, given that equation (26) is satisfied. 
Proof: 
If the curves are intersected at a point in R^, that means, at least around the 
neighborhood, certain range of a curve must have a large value than another. 
In our case, Pp^{x) and Ppy{y) cire two curve intersect at x\ from the above 
assertion, Pp^A^) must be larger than ppy{y) in some ranges. 
Q.KD. 
The result is different from Reinganum and Wilde (1991), which shows that as 
long as practitioner penalties are strictly positive, higher level o f audit policy 
enforcement wi l l be set to practitioner-filed return than to a taxpayer-filed return 
whereby same level o f incomes is reported. However, this result matches other 
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theoretical/empirical researches such as Beck, Davis and Jung (1989) and Klepper, 
Mazur and Nagin (1991). In the model presented above, even i f the practitioner 
penalties are strictly positive given that taxpayer could give an advice to taxpayer and 
incur a cost (benefit) for over-reporting (under-reporting). 
After we confined the conditions for the existence of intersection, we now 
present the conditions ofp口入x) > (or <) Ppy{y). 
As presented above, the analytical expressions of p口 入x) and p^ “少）are very 
complicated. In order to establish the conditions for the comparison of magnitude of 
Pp,xi^) and Pp^yiy), we perform the following steps: 
Step 1: Take differential o f the equations (20) and (21-0), we have: 
{2Bp-A-B-y + y)dp + {p-\)dy=0 
(1 + ；^  — 為 ) " 。 = - 〜 x p 广 + — 义 ] ^ 
c c c 
Step 2: Find the slopes of the equations in Step 1: 
Let = 年 = - ( 1 - p ) 忧 < 。11 x e [0 ,x ) 
P dx … 冲 + 一 exp(:i"(f-」） 
S 一 却 - 0 - P ) _ - - 0 - P ) 、 … 
and dy {2Bp-A-B - y + y) {A + B - y-2Bp) ’ 
for {A + B^'y-y-2Bp)>0 
Step 3: Compare the locality steepness o f 2 audit polices at 
X = = (and p^ ^ (x) = p^ ^ ( y ) ) by using the ratio of S^JS^^ at 
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Spx C + . 1 (。7) 
Step 4: As / can also be expressed in terms of A, B, c, n and t , we can 
establish conditions of the set of parameters so that we can compare the locality 
steepness, i.e. S pj S py is a function of A, B, c, 7C and t . 
We have the following corollary to see whether the slope of is flatter, i.e. 
less negative. 
Corollary 2: The slope of p^ ^ (x) ’ S^^ ,is larger, i.e. flatter, than that of p^、,(少）’ 
S py, provided the following conditions are satisfied: 
C2-L + 
广 ” c + ^ 1 , , ^ 
C2-2. = ^^ * — . < 1’ and 
TTT + + + IBTT) e x p ( - J ^ ^ ) 
The first condition ensured p^ y (少）is negative and the second condition is the result 
from the comparison between S^^ and S评，or so called locality steepness condition 
Proposition 3: 
If x" exists and the conditions in corollary 2 are satisfied, then there exists a 
s >0 such that Pp^yiy* +s)< Ppjx* + s) 
and Ppjx、s)< Pp j / -s). 
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Proof: ^ - h m - ^ ； ^ 
乃 ^->0 y + s - y 
S = lim 〜 ’ “ ~ - — — - ~ ^ ^ ^ - ， w h e r e s is a very positive small number. 
P X -\-s-x 
By Corollary 2, if c2-l and c2-2 are satisfied, S^^ < S ^ ^. Or, 
lim < lim + 
£•—0+ g S 
As Ppy{y*) = Pp^xi^*) and s is positive. 
Therefore, there must exist a s>0 , provided thats is small enough, such 
that Pp^^x* +s)> p^^iy* +£) 
By similar argument, we will have p^ ^ ( j / —s)〉p” {x* - s) 
Q.E.D 
Furthermore, as / is unique in the domain [0, x) we can extend preposition 3 
to preposition 4: 
Proposition 4: 
If x* uniquely exists and the conditions in Corollary 2 are satisfied, then 
pp’丈{x = s) is smaller (or larger) than p^ ^{y = s), where sg [0, x*)(orse {x*，x)). 
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Proof: ‘‘ Pp 丈{x = s) is smaller than p戸入y 二 s)“ 
For some points (x,yj = 〈 f l = x * — 二 g [0 ,x*)x [0,x*) , for some s >0, and 
proposition 3, we have p = a) < ” ( 少 = . F o r any eE [0,x*)ande<a, as the 
audit policies are monotonic decreasing, we will have 
p p x{x = a - e) < Ppy{y-CI-e) until e is large enough such that 
Pp，叉(x = a-e) = Ppy {y -a-e), where (x, y) € [0，x"") x [0, x*) . However, 
X* (eqiiivalently y*) is unique in the domain[0,x], i.e. the audit policies will not 
intersect each other except in x*. As such, p = a-e) - p p y{y = ci - e) will 
not happen in the domain[0,x*) and thus Pp^{x-a-e)< ppy{y -ci-e) for 
它e [0, jc*)ande<a. As ae [0,x*) and e [0, ) and by lettings=a-e, we can 
conclude that, for any s g [0,x*), p^^(x = s) is smaller thanPpy{y = s). 
For the rest of the preposition, we can prove it by using similar arguments in the 
above. 
O.E.D. . 
Preposition 4 is the generalization of preposition 3. In our model, equation (24) 
gives the unique solution of x* , which is presented in (25) and thus preposition 4 
holds when equation (24) and the existence condition holds. 
The analytical solution in (20) cannot be easily shown in graphic settings. In 
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order to perform further analysis, I run simulation of Pp,,{x) and Ppy(y) and 
produce a graph to illustrate the optimal behavior. 
The simulated graph for p^ ^(x) and Pp^yiy) is presented as follows: 
1 • 
、 \ J U ) 
j w 函 
I \ \ 
I \'| X or f 
I__.__._- • ‘ I____.__.__L-__.__._• * __.___£ ' 4 
本• 
. I X 
Figure 1 
In figure 1, we assign a value to x and boundary condition of Ppy{y) so that 
Pp^yiy) and pp 入x) have the value with the audit policy probability becomes zero, 
i.e. making x=y and x=y =0. This arrangement can make the comparison of 
these two policies more reasonable and more consistent. The audit policies are 
downward sloping and smaller than 1 in the region. This result is consistent with the 
prior researches. 
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The more important result is the different level of enforcement audit policies at 
different level of reporting income. From figure 1, we can see that when the 
reporting income (x or y) is low, that the corresponding audit policy enforced by the 
tax authority for the tax practitioner filed return is higher than that of taxpayer filed 
return. On the other hand, when the reporting income is approaching the maximum 
reportable income of the distribution (so called "high income level"), the level audit 
policy enforcement for tax practitioner is lower than that for taxpayer. As x and y 
are two different function of taxable income (that is, given a / , , x and y should not be 
equal), the above graph only shows that attitude of tax authority toward these two 
kind of reporting. We cannot directly compare the level of compliance of taxpayer 
and tax practitioner. We need some adjustments presented in the following 
paragraph such that we can compare the levels of compliance. 
In order to compare the level of compliance of taxpayer and tax practitioner, after 
substituting the optimal enforcement audit policy into the inverse reporting policy 
function, we need to obtain the reporting polices of the taxpayer and tax 
practitioner r^ ( I 〖 ) b y taking inverse of the inverse reporting policy function. 
Figure 2 is summarized the behavior of the reporting policies. 
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X or y 
I 
Figure 2 
Interestingly, we find that tax practitioner wil l not report any income for the 
taxable income lower than xyo. Further, when the reporting income is higher than xyo, 
the corresponding reporting policy for tax practitioner is higher than that of taxpayer. 
We can summarize the result as follows:. 
Result 3.1: 
Tax practitioner will not report any income for income level is lower that xy；. The 
reporting income of tax practitioner will be higher than that of taxpayer if the 
reporting income is set above x*, 
Combining preposition 2 and result 1, we have 
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Result 3.2: 
The reporting policy of tax practitioner is lower than that of taxpayer if the reporting 
income of both players is higher than xyj, Eqiiivalently, if the reporting income of 
tax practitioner is higher than that of taxpayer, then the enforcement level of audit 
policy of tax practitioner is lower than that of taxpayer. 
Result 3.1 and 3.2 further confirm that, for some certain income level, tax 
practitioner may improve the compliance. However, tax practitioner still tends to 
under-report taxable income, in the lower of income level, given the set of parameters 
used in this part. 
2. Different level of part icipation of tax practit ioner 
We have seen in the above section that the comparison between the audit policies 
of, and compliance behaviors of’ taxpayer self-filed and tax practitioner filed tax 
returns. 
In contrast to the analysis o f taxpayer in Reinganum and Wilde (1986), we do not 
focus on investigating the different compliance behaviors o f different incomes and 
max reportable income classes. In this and next section, we wi l l focus on the change 
of 2 important exogenous variables, a and appeared in p^ ^(y) only. We wi l l 
focus on how the change of a affects the compliance behavior o f tax practitioner 
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first in this section. 
We set a small change (decrease) in a and observe the change in behavior. 
In order to have the same basis for this comparison, we use the same initial condition 
for the two levels of a . 
In figure 3-1, a simulated graph is presented. We can see that the audit policy 
function, p(y), shifts outward, given a fixed y , when a is decreased. 
秘 J 〜、、\ : K 
. • ‘ ^ ^ y 
y 
Figure 3-1 
The result above is similar to the result in section 3 of Reinganum and Wilde 
(1986), where presented the result o f changing maximum income level. However, as 
the maximum reporting income is fixed in"this paper, the result is not exactly the same. 
The result here is quite non-trivial because the increase (decrease) in the proportion of 
accepting does not seem to be related to the upward shifting of audit policy. 
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The result above may be interpreted by fixing a level of reporting income. 
Considering that we have certain level of reporting income, y^, a decrease in a 
makes the level of audit policy /？广乂（乂） increase. That means the tax authority wi l l 
audit the return, which is prepared according to the advice made by the tax 
practitioner, with higher probability i f the exogenous level o f accepting advice from 
tax practitioner is reduced. 
Result 2.1: 
If a is decreased (increased), provided that all the maximization conditions hold, 
then they audit policy p^ •(少）will shift oiit\vard(inward) in the p ” (y) -y plate. 
From the changed audit policy, we can find the implied reporting income, 
Figure 3-2 . y 
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Result 2.2: 
If a is increased (decreased), provided that all the maximization conditions hold, 
then the reporting policy advised by tax practitioner will shift inward (outward). 
In figure 3-2’ the reporting polices with 2 different level of practitioner 
participation are presented. When a is decreased, the reporting police/advice 
made by practitioner shifts outward and gets away from the actual taxable income. 
In other words, the reduced level o f a makes the advice made by tax practitioner a 
lower level of compliance. 
Combining the above 2 results, we can conclude that reduce the acceptance rate of 
the advised made by tax practitioner can lower the compliance intention of tax 
practitioner. The lower level o f starting point for reporting occurs at the same time 
as the audit rate reduced at all y between 0 and>^. The story now is clear, the lower 
level o f acceptance ( a is decreased) first induces tax practitioner less willingness to 
making non-zero advice and lower level of compliance. The reason is that chance of 
being audited and penalized would be lowered i f or is decreased. In our model, 
practitioner wi l l not be penalized as long as its advice is not accepted. As such, tax 
practitioner is tempted to report a lower income (or zero for a large range) because 
they have incentive to report a lower income by a factor -iip(y-x), which is a benefit 
when y<x. 
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Furthermore, the lower compliance wil l induce the tax authority to have a higher 
frequency of audit. 
In our model, we capture the situation that the lower level of acceptance from 
client wil l induce the lower level of compliance and thus the higher level of audit. 
3. Different level of the marginal cost/benefit of "dispari ty" between taxpayer 
and practitioner 
In this section, we wil l present the result of adjusting the cost/benefit of 
"disparity" between taxpayer and practitioner, u^. The reason of adjusting u^ is 
the importance of this variable, u^ is the key variable of the whole model. Without 
Up, the optimal of audit policy of tax practitioner, Pp ^ y ) , cannot be found in 
mathematical point of view. The variable 11^  also captures the conflict/relation of 
taxpayer and tax practitioner. Thus, it is necessary to see how the change of u^ 
affects the compliance behavior. 
Similar to section 4, we now change (increase) the 11 卩 and observe the change in 
behavior. In order to have the same bases for this comparison, we use the same 
boundary condition for the two levels of w厂 We draw the simulated graph and 
compare the different between the two simulated curves in figure 5-1. 
Similar to the case in section 2, when ii^ is increased (in section 2, a is 
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decreased) the audit policy wi l l shift upward, i.e., i f the incentive or the cost for 






We have Result 3.1, which is analogue to the Result 2.1, as follows: 
Result 3.1: 
If upis increased (decreased), provided that all the maximization conditions hold, 
then the optimal audit policy p^ ^ (少) )wi l l shift outward (inward) in the p” (y) -y 
plate. 
We can see that increase in the cost/benefit of "disparity" could yield the similar 
effect as a decrease in a . The reason of an increase the marginal level of 
benefit/cost raises the audit policy is not direct and simple. Again, we need to 
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explain this phenomenon together with the change of implied reporting policy of 
taxpayer. We have the simulated figure as follows: 
- i ^ 
‘/巧f 
L ^ 力 „ 
7 
Figure 4-2 
In figure 4-2’ we know that the effect of increase in u^ is a right-hand-side-shifting 
of the reporting policy function. 
Result 3.2: 
If II is increased (decreased), provided that all the maximization conditions hold, 
“ A 
then the reporting policy advised by tax practitioner will shift outward (inwards). 
Combining the above 2 results, we can conclude that rise in the marginal cost/benefit 
of "disparity" between taxpayer and practitioner can lower the compliance intention 
of tax practitioner. From the above result, we can deduce that tax practitioner treats 
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Up a benefit rather than a cost. This fact may raise a doubt that tax practitioner are 
likely to make a lower level reporting income advice to taxpayer because the lower 
the reporting income, the higher the benefit tax practitioner can make. However, as 
we do not have the relationship equation between the tax-advice made by tax 
practitioner and reporting income made by taxpayer. We cannot make conclusion 
about the doubt. However, this result gives us cures for further research. We can 
build up a model with endogenous acceptance rate so that we may have an extra 
equation about the relationship between x and y. 
4. Conclusion 
The chapter is a special case of the equilibrium conditions of chapter 2. We 
specify the formal form of the cost function and then draw the 
The results show some new ideas about reporting behavior of tax practitioner. 
The most important idea is the higher willingness of compliance of tax practitioner in 
some region of income. We are using the Reinganum and Wilde approach to match 
other theoretical result of other literatures such as Beck, Davis and Jung (1989) and 
Klepper, Mazur and Nagin (1991). As shown in an empirical research done in B. 
Eraud (1993), the adjusted non-compliance rate of tax practitioner is not higher than 
that of taxpayer in some income range. Although other conclusions in B. Eraud 
(1993) is not the same as the conclusion in this chapter, the key here idea is still 
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shown ~ the compliance level of tax practitioner, in general, could be higher or lower 
than that of taxpayer. 
-End of Chapter 3-
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Chapter 4: Model of tax compliance, tax 
practitioner as an information provider 
1. Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, we have introduced a theoretical model with more 
involvement of tax practitioner. Tax practitioner wil l have certain level of 
involvement by making a "strategic" advice to taxpayer. In practice, when 
providing tax services, tax practitioner has at least one of the two responsibilities: the 
first one is preparation of tax return and the second is providing informative advisory. 
In the previous chapter the advice made by tax practitioner is a strategic variable and 
determines within the system. Also, the preparation cost in the system also captures 
the preparation advantage of tax practitioner. However, the "advisor" role of tax 
practitioner is not emphasized in the content because the strategic advice made by 
them do not contains any additional information and, more importantly, taxpayers 
have full information about their taxable income and audit policies of tax authority 
and additional information from tax practitioner is not needed. 
In this chapter, we are going to develop a new model, which emphasize on the 
advisory role of tax practitioner. The setting of this model is different from that of 
previous literatures and the focus of this model is shifted from the interaction between 
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tax authority and taxpayer to the interaction between taxpayer and tax practitioner, i.e. 
the audit policy of tax authority wi l l not be determined and emphasized in the system. 
In this chapter, we wil l begin by introducing a basic model of tax compliance, in 
which 2 types of uninformed taxpayers, conservative type (honest) and aggressive 
type (non-honest), will determine their reporting actions. Then, we wil l introduce a 
partially informed tax practitioner to give advice to taxpayer in a one-period setting. 
2 Basic model for tax compliance 
Backgrounds 
The model in this section is the foundation of the models in chapter. Here, we 
are going to discuss a simple case of tax compliance. 
Many taxpayers are naturally honest, like the case in Eraud and Feinstein (1994). 
They try to comply with the tax system by virtue. These taxpayers may also be 
uncertain about it actual taxable income due to the lack of knowledge of tax system, 
regulation and the practice of tax authority. As a result, even honest taxpayers may 
not fully report its taxable income or may over deduct their expenses. Similarly, 
non-honest taxpayers are not always over deducting its expenses i f they are not well 
informed. The whole story in this chapter is started with the above idea. 
Consider a world with taxpayers and a tax authority only. Taxpayers are facing 
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a problem of whether a type of expense is tax deductible and how much should be 
deducted. For example, a company is uncertain about whether a donation made in 
the financial year is tax deductible. Taxpayers have limited knowledge about the 
actual state of world, d^. They only know that either = 0 or In other 
words, this expense is either fully deductible or not deductible. Taxpayers do not 
know about the current state of world and thus guess the state of world randomly. 
Taxpayers form belief about the state of world, call d , where d is random variable 
over the range [0,1], Taxpayers can choose their actions in the action set A cz [0,1] 
based on their belief and their objective functions. We let d be the random 
variable describing the belief of taxpayer on the events d^ - 0,1. There are 2 types 
of taxpayers. The first type taxpayers try to make their deduction "close" to the true 
deduction, whether an over or under-reporting wi l l let them feel unhappy. We call 
them "honest" or "conservative type" taxpayers. Another type of taxpayers wi l l 
maximize their monetary payoff and wil l feel good (bad) when they are 
over-deducting (under-deducting) the expense, when compare with their expectation. 
We call them "non-honest" or "aggressive type" taxpayers. 
On the other hand, tax authority faces different taxpayers from different types. 
It wi l l first carry out a preliminary audit for all taxpayers and it is assumed that they 
can verify which tax practitioner is over-deducting and which is under-deducting, but 
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they cannot determine the amount of variance at this stage. It sets their audit policy, 
p, and the penalty rate on under-reporting taxable income, TU , based on previous 
experience and the cost and benefit for auditing a deducible item and tries to 
maximize its revenue. We further assume that tax authority can detect an 
under-reporting item with probability, A , when they carry audit. As such, tax 
authority wi l l audit and eventually detect an under-reporting item with probability Ap . 
In other words, even a taxpayer who is over-deducting tax expense, they still have 
probability Ap to escape from the punishment. 
For those taxpayers who wil l not over-deduct expenses, then the probability of 
being penalized wil l equal to zero, i.e. /l/? = 0, because tax authority wil l not treat 
those complied taxpayer unjustly (i.e. tax authority wi l l not make mistakes of 
penalizing someone who are fully complied). 
Objective functions and results 
The ex-ante payoffs to be presented are made up by two components. The first 
component is "psychological" payoff and the second component is "economic" payoff. 
Noted that all the items should originally be multiplied by a constant tax rate t to 
represent the tax amount saved or psychological tax amount deviation, however, as 
every item includes a constant tax rate t, we can simply drop it for payoff 
maximization purpose and thus no tax rate appears in the payoffs. 
5 3 
Psychological payoffs represent the conscience of taxpayers. Honest taxpayers 
would like to report their tax deductible close to his expectation. Thus, any over or 
under reporting is a kind of disutility. For non-honest taxpayers, they wi l l feel good 
(positive utility) i f they deduct more and feel bad (negative util ity) i f they deduct an 
expenses less than what they expected to deduct. 
Economics payoff is the monetary items that taxpayers need to consider. 
As the objective function of taxpayers is an ex ante payoff of them, we here call 
these objective functions for their decision "perceived payoff ’ and set out as follows: 
For honest/conservative taxpayers, the perceived payoff, N人a): 
Nc{a\a> E{d)) = E{d) \+a-^p7r{a-E{d)) 
A^ c (fl I a < E{d)) = 一 I a — E{d) | 
For non-honest/aggressive taxpayers, the perceived payoff, : 
iV,(a I a > E{d)) = {a-E{d)) + a- Ap7r{a-E(d)) 
N^ (a I fl < E{d)) = {a-E{d)) + a 
We define that the term "penalty item" equals to the probability o f being 
penalized times the penalty rate times the over-deducted expense or the expense 
believed to be over-deducted, i.e. Ap7r{a — E{d)). Taxpayers believe that they wi l l 
not be penalized i f their reported expense in question lower than their expected value 
of the deduction." As such, the "penalty item", Apjrifi 一 E{d)), is not included in the 
perceived payoff i f a < E{d). 
The first item of the above payoffs is psychological based and the second and 
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third items are the tax to be saved (i.e. a) and the penalty item. 
Noted that the purpose of perceived payoffs is used for determining the 
actions,a^ A , of different type of taxpayers. In formulating the above objective 
functions, we assume that the taxable incomes of taxpayers are large enough to enjoy 
the deduction, when the deduction is deductible. Furthermore, the objective function 
is the perceived payoff o f a typical taxpayer of different types of taxpayers. 
For the convenience of calculation and based on the assumption about the belief 
abovementioned, we assumption that there is 1/2 chance the expense is turn out 
deductible and 1/2 chance not deductible {d^ =0 ). In other words 
taxpayers treat d as a random variable with Bernoulli distribution such that the 
probability of d。二 0 is 1/2 and d^ - 1 is 1/2. Given d follows Bernoulli 
distribution, under the belief o f taxpayers, we have: 
£(6/) = 1/2(0) + 1/2(1) = 1/2 
The perceived payofts become: 
= — —却;r(a —1/2) 
= — — ( 2 7 ) 
N^{a\a>\l2)^{a-\l2)^a-^7r(a-\l2) 
NSci\a<\l2) = {a-\l2) + a (28) 
From the above equation we have Lemma 1: 
Lemma 1 
Given d follows BernoiilU distribution with the probability P(d^J)=P(d=0)^ 1/2 
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and AfTT <1, a typical honest taxpayer maximizes his perceived payoff by choosing 
action a = ^ and a typical non-honest taxpayer maximizes his perceived payoff by 
choosing action a- regardless the actual state of world. 
Proof: 
For a typical honest taxpayer; 
I f 0 < a < ^ , then 
-(2a - which is a strictly increasing function on a 
Therefore, NXa=、)>NJfi), \/a e [0,^) 
I f ^ < a < 1 , then 
N 人 a\a>\l 2、二 -{a - —) + a - Ap7r{a —丄） 




which is a strictly decreasing function on a, Vug (^,1] 
We can see that N。{a\a>\ll)=丄―—丄）< 丄’ Va g (+，1] 
Therefore, = 二全 > A^。(小 > 1 /2) ’ Va g 
. . 1 . . 
Therefore, choosing action a= — yields the highest payoff. 
For a typical non-honest taxpayer: 
N ^{a\a > ^ {a - + a - Xpn{a - , is strictly increasing V a e (^,1] i.e. 
{a = 1) > tV^ (a) > 0 V a E ( j , 1) and 
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Also, 二 I ) =a> N^ (a | a < = {2a —备)’ which is smaller than zero. 
Thus, 7V“(a = l ) > i V “ 《 ) , V a e [ 0 , l ) 
Q.E.D. 
“ a = I ” means that taxpayer wi l l report half the amount of expense in tax 
return. However, we can also interpret this figure as taxpayer wi l l have mixed 
strategy such that the probabilities of choosing to deduct and not to deduct the 
expense are both 1/2. 
Lemma 1 has important meanings. Consider the expense turns out to be 
non-deductible, i.e. actual state of world d‘飞 二 Q ’ honest taxpayers wi l l deduct half o f 
the expense and non-honest taxpayers wi l l deduct the full amount of expense in the 
tax return, i.e. both types of taxpayers wi l l under-report the tax income (or over 
deduct the tax expenses). When the expense turns out to be deductible, i.e. actual 
state of world honest taxpayers still deduct half of the expense and 
non-honest taxpayers still deduct full amount of expense in the tax return. However, 
in this case, honest taxpayer is over-reporting the taxable income, or under-deducting 
its tax allowable expense and non-honest taxpayer is just complied with the tax 
regulation. In this case, even non-honest taxpayers are said to have filed a ful ly 
complied tax return because their reporting policy does not lead to any tax evasion. 
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The model abovementioned and the corresponding result are nice. First of all, it 
is simple when we compare it with the previous literatures. We only need to make 
assumptions about the expected penalty Apn and the distribution of deduction and we 
do not need to assume taxpayers know the full information of tax regulations and the 
audit policies of tax authority. Secondly, and more importantly, it explains the result 
why "over-reporting" exists in the real world, see Eraud and Feinstein (1994), while 
other models did not emphasize. The model also justifies the existence of high 
compliance rate, i.e. even non-honest taxpayer wil l make full compliance, and explain 
the facts of over-reporting of tax returns in practice by using incomplete information 
setting. However, some weaknesses are in this model. This model does not explain 
how tax rate affects the compliance rate, the interactions between audit policy of tax 
authority and the compliance behavior of taxpayers as the prior models does. 
3 Model for tax compliance with tax practitioner 
Backgrounds 
In last section, we see how taxpayers report their “expenses” with uncertainty. 
In this section, we wil l introduce a tax practitioner to the model. This tax 
practitioner has better knowledge about the tax system than does the taxpayers. 
The tax practitioner are said to be a good advisor in terms of technical 
knowledge and professional conduct. They can provide an informative advice, even 
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i f they are not perfectly informed. Thus, these tax practitioners are technical capable. 
Their decision making base wil l adapt to the objective function of “compliance” type 
taxpayers in order to make their advice close to their expectation of the state of world. 
Thus, they are said to be ethical. Inspired by the setting in Morris (2001) for good 
advisor, we set out the model below to capture the characteristics of tax practitioner 
and the relationship between taxpayers and tax practitioners. 
Suppose taxpayers are facing the same problem in section 2.1, but now they can 
file their returns as in section 2.1 or consult a tax practitioner who is partially 
informed about whether the taxpayer's expense is tax deductible, i.e. the state of 
world. The tax practitioner observes state of world with certain level of knowledge 
and can correctly determine the “actual” state of world with probability p > ^ but 
may make an error with probability p < — . The tax practitioner wil l then give 
an advice, which is consistent with what he observes, to his client, the taxpayer. I f a 
taxpayer has chosen to seek profession advice, he wil l automatically accept the advice. 
We may then determine whether taxpayer wi l l choose to seek tax practitioner's advice 
by backward induction. 
Before proceeding, we here introduce another set of objective function used for 
choosing whether a taxpayer should use a professional advice. In the previous section, 
we have discussed about the "perceived payoffs" for making decision of action a . 
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This type of payoffs is ex ante payoffs. Decision maker is uncertain about the actual 
payoff after the state of world is known. As we need to use backward induction to 
find whether taxpayer should choose to use tax practitioner, an ex post payofif should 
be introduced in the content. We call the ex post payofts "actual payofts", AN. 
As defined, actual payofts are ex post payoffs. Therefore, the payoffs should be a 
measure of utility after action a is chosen by taxpayer, based on perceived payofts 
and the actual state of world, d^, is known. Although the name of this payoff is 
“actual payoffs", the formation is based on different objective of different types o f 
taxpayers, not based the monetary amount. 
As such, taxpayers wi l l consider the expected "actual payoffs，，，which have the 
same formula as the "perceived payoff,, but conditioned on the state of world and 
given actiona，」A^(<:7|JJ，noted that "penalty item" wil l not be included in the 
payofts i f the action, the reported expense a , is smaller than the value state of world. 
We here discuss the situations as follows: 
Not seeking advice: 
The equations actual payoffs of honest taxpayers: 
A ^ M I Xpn{a - d j 
We analyze the actual payoff case by case: 
6 0 
二 0 
When the expense in doubt turns out to be deductible, honest taxpayer is 
over-reporting his taxable income and thus no penalty item is included. 
= 去 ; J “ = 0 ) = — I 去 — 0 | + 去 一 0 ) 
=丄—丄(1 + 如 ; T ) 二- — ApTT 
2 2 ^ 1 
When the expense in doubt turns out to be non-deductible, honest taxpayer is 
under-reporting his taxable income and thus penalty item is included. 
The equations actual payoffs of non-honest taxpayers: 
力A^a(a I J。，tz > t / J = (t? — t / J + tz - ApTrO - " J 
AN 
We analyze the actual payoff case by case: 
= 1 
When the expense in doubt turns out to be deductible, non-honest taxpayer is just 
complied income and thus no penalty item is included. 
AN 丄€1二\‘人=0)=:(l-0) + l - ; i ^ ; r ( l - 0 ) 
=2- Xpjt 
When the expense in doubt turns out to be non-deductible, honest taxpayer is 
under-reporting his taxable income and thus penalty item is included. 
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Seeking advice: 
Assure that the tax practitioner wi l l charge a fixed competitive fee, F where 
F G (0, oo), so that we can image that not all taxpayer wi l l seek advice. For 
convenience of comparison, we did not consider fee has any effect in this part (or we 
may assure the fee is very small). However, we wi l l further discuss the condition of 
professional in the next part and thus set out the condition such that the result wi l l not 
be affected. 
The equation o f actual payoffs of honest taxpayers: 
AN'c{a,p\ d j = pANM = < K ) + (1 - p)ANXci 
Again, i f a < d^，the penalty item wi l l not be included in the actual payoffs 
equations. 
We analyze case by case: 
("二 1 ， " | " 。 = | 1 - 1 | + 1 ) + ( 1 - " ) ( - | 0 - 1 丨+0) 
= 2 p - l - F (possibly >, 二, <)0 
0，p|^/“ =0) = p(-|0 —0|+0) + ( l - p ) [ — | 1 -0 | + 1 —;ip;r(l-0)] 
= ( p - 一F(poss ib ly >, =,<)--Apju 
The equations actual payoffs of non-honest taxpayers: 
AN\{a, p\d^) = pANa {a 二 ) + (1-p )AN^ (a^dJdJ-F 
We analyze case by case: 
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with probabilityj p.人二 V): p[{\ — 1) +1] + (1 -厂 ) [ ( 0 - l ) + 0 ] - F 
= 2 p - \ - F <\ 
AN\{a = 0 with probability p \ = p[(0 — 0) + 0] + (1 - p) [ ( l - 0) +1 - A.p7i{\ — 0)] 
= ( 1 - p ) { 2 一 AfTT) < 2-Xpn 
It is obvious that non-honest taxpayer wil l be better off i f he choose to 
depend on his own filing strategy, given 1 > p > ^ . However, the decision of 
honest taxpayers depends on the fee level. I f the fee is small enough then honest 
taxpayers wil l seek the advice. We wi l l discuss the fee policy in the following 
section. Furthermore, the decisions of both types of taxpayers are independent of the 
state of world. 
The result is not surprising. A simple setting yields a simple conclusion. Honest 
taxpayer prefers to have more information about the state of world so that they can 
improve the level of compliance. Therefore, honest taxpayer wil l enjoy higher level 
of utility by employing professional tax practitioner, given a range of acceptable fees. 
On the other hand, tax practitioner tries to give more information to non-honest 
taxpayer, but the utility of non-honest taxpayer wil l not be increased (or wi l l decrease) 
by higher level of compliance. Thus, non-honest taxpayer is not better off by 
seeking professional advice. 
4 Professional fee policy 
The professional fees of tax practitioner are included in the above model. We 
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need to discuss about the possible professional fee policy. I f we assume that the tax 
consulting industry is monopolistic competition (Reinganum and Wilde (1991)), tax 
consultant wi l l charge a fee such that each tax consultant cannot gain an abnormal 
profit. On the other hand, taxpayer wi l l use the professional service as long as the 
fee is less than the benefit for seeking professional advice. We have simple decision 
rule i f the actual state of world is given. For example, i f the actual state of world is 
equal to 1, then the benefit of seeking professional advice for honest taxpayer is 
2p-\-F . Thus, as long as the fee is less than2厂—1，taxpayer should continue to 
seek professional advice, given 
However, the problem here is more complicated. In our model, taxpayers do 
not know the actual state of world ( i f they know the actual state of world, they simply 
do not need the tax practitioner). Taxpayers wi l l consider their expected benefit for 
seeking professional advice. As non-honest taxpayer wi l l not seek advice, even the 
professional fee is zero, we only consider honest taxpayer for professional fee analysis 
below. Before seeking the advice, honest taxpayers believe that the state of world is 
under Bernoulli distribution. Taxpayers believe that the state of world wi l l equal to 1 
with probability 0.5 and equal to 0 with probability 0.5. Thus, the expected benefit 
for seeking professional advice is 0.5 times expected benefit when the actual state of 
world equals to 1 plus 0.5 times expected benefit when the actual state of world 
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equals to 0. We have the expected benefit for seeking advice: 
厂 1 _ 
0 . 5 [ ( 2 p - l - F - O j + 0.5 {p-\){Xp7r)-F-
二0.5 2p-\^{p-]^Ap7r -F 
二 0.5 + -F 
二 0 . 5 ( p - 去 ) + i; ’〉0 
1.e. 
F <0.S{p-]^[2 + :\pn 
Thus, taxpayer wi l l seek professional advice as long as the competitive 
professional fees set below0.5(厂-去)[2 +却; r ] , even taxpayer may worse-off i f the 
actual state of world is 1 and the fee ranges from -丄 to 0.5(p —丄)[2 + . 
Finally, we can know the factors affecting the level of fees, which are acceptable 
for taxpayers. First of all, the probability of making correct advice, p , is a key 
positive factor for determining the level o f acceptable fees. As p implied the 
relative level o f accuracy o f advice made by the tax practitioner, the fee policy 
suggests that a tax practitioner, who is able to give appropriate advices, could change 
a higher level of fees. Furthermore, the higher chance of being penalized by tax 
authority, i.e. higher Apjr , the higher the fees that practitioner may charge. It is also 
a natural conclusion. 
-End of chapter 4-
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
In this thesis, two different tax compliance models are presented. Although these 
two models try to investigate the role of tax practitioner in tax compliance process, they 
are set in very different ways. The first model is a theoretical model. This model 
aims at generalize the model of Reningum and Wilde (1986). The second model aims 
at analyzing the tax compliance model with uncertainty with a simpler setting. We 
summarize the results as follows. 
For the first model, we divide it into chapter 2 and chapter 3. In chapter 2, we set 
up the model and then give the equilibrium conditions. The optimum conditions are 
found by using similar method of Reinganum and Wilde (1986). In chapter 3，we 
further analyze the model with a defined form cost function. We compare the audit 
policy and reporting policy of taxpayer and tax practitioner. The result of this model 
shows the compliance inclination of tax practitioner and taxpayer. The implicit 
reporting functions of taxpayer and tax practitioner are retrieved. Tax practitioner 
may report a taxable income closer (to the actual income) than does taxpayer. This 
result matches some of prior literatures. 
Further, the change of parameter wil l affect the compliance behavior of tax 
practitioner. This kind of changes gives some idea about the ways of further research 
in this area. The change of the marginal cost/benefit of "disparity" between taxpayer 
and practitioner and the acceptance rate of practitioner has effect on the compliance 
level. When we investigate the acceptance rate of practitioner do has effect on the 
compliance level, we see that it is good to do further research this variable endogenous 
to see the relation between the tax advice made by tax practitioner and taxpayer's self 
tax reporting income. 
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For the second model, we focus on an expense in doubt, i.e. the taxpayer does not 
know whether this expense is tax deductible. We introduce two types of taxpayers, 
namely, honest and non-honest. They wil l have different compliance behavior under 
this setting. In our first sub-model, no tax practitioner is involved. This sub-model 
predicts that both honest and non-honest taxpayer may over/under report deductible 
expense. This sub-model explains why tax compliance rate is high in some empirical 
literatures. The result behind may be due to incomplete information. The core 
model here is the tax compliance model with tax practitioner. We find that non-honest 
taxpayer wi l l never seek advice and honest taxpayer wil l seek advice for a "reasonable" 
range of professional fees. 
The second model's setting is new and has rooms to improve and further research. 
For example, a 2-period /-multiple period model can be formed so that the dynamic 
effects of tax practitioner wi l l be show. It is expected that multiple period effects may 
increase the inclination of non-honest taxpayer to take the advice of tax practitioner be 
fore the last period because the heavier penalty for recurring non-compliance may 
make the compliance incentive of taxpayer increase. Another extension could be 
introduction of tax authority. In most of other literatures. 
In summary, the core model of this thesis is the first model, which suggests a 
generalized model of tax compliance. The setting and result of model suggests more 
points, which get closer to the practice. The second model suggests a new way to tax 
compliance literatures. The setting gives new cures to investigate the behavior of 
taxpayer and tax practitioner. 
- E n d of chapter 5 -
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